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Land Reform and Conflict in South Sudan: 
Evidence from Yei River County 
Peter Hakim Justin and Han van Dijk 
Abstract: Following South Sudanese independence in 2011, land reform 
became a major aspect of state building, partly to address historical in-
justices and partly to avoid future conflicts around land. In the process, 
land became a trigger for conflicts, sometimes between communities with 
no histories of “ethnic conflict.” Drawing on cases in two rural areas in Yei 
River County in South Sudan, this paper shows that contradictions in the 
existing legal frameworks on land are mainly to blame for those conflicts. 
These contradictions are influenced, in turn, by the largely top-down ap-
proach to state building, which has tended to neglect changes in society 
and regarding land resulting from colonialism and civil wars. 
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Like in many countries of postcolonial Africa, land in South Sudan is not 
only central to state building, but also a major contributor to conflicts, 
poverty, and underdevelopment. As analysts have pointed out, the land 
question was central to the North–South civil war in Sudan that ended 
up splitting the country in 2011 (Hirblinger 2015; Justin and van Leeu-
wen 2016; Öhm 2014; Brosché 2014). Perceptions of marginalisation of 
peripheral areas by the centre also played a role in the civil war. But 
those perceptions were linked to land rights, argued on the basis of in-
creased interference by the state in the land rights of rural communities 
(Deng 1990). Against this backdrop, the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A), right from its beginnings in 1983, stated 
that the consolidation of land rights of rural communities and the broad-
ening of the power base for inclusive governance were among its objec-
tives. It articulated those objectives through the slogans “the land be-
longs to the community” and “taking towns to the people,” which at-
tracted many rural communities to join the movement (Hirblinger 2015: 
710). When negotiating the peace talks that resulted in the Comprehen-
sive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, the SPLM pushed for the inclu-
sion of land reform in the final agreement, which ultimately paid off 
(GoS 2005: 48).  
During the interim period (2005–2011), state building in South Su-
dan emphasised land reform, partly in order to address historical injus-
tices and partly to avoid future conflicts around land. However, state 
building has been taking place alongside increased levels of violent con-
flicts, including civil wars. Small-scale conflicts escalated into wider con-
flicts, and conflicts rooted in contestations among political elites trickled 
down to cause friction between local communities (De Vries and Justin 
2014). Though the causes of those conflicts are multifaceted, land has 
come to play a central role as a trigger for conflicts or a platform for 
expressing other grievances (Justin and van Leeuwen 2016). It seems as 
though efforts to build a state through land reform have generated con-
flicts, civil wars, forceful displacements, and human suffering.  
This paper draws on cases in two rural areas in Yei River County to 
illuminate the relations between land reform and conflict in South Sudan. 
It argues that contradictions between the Land Act of 2009 and the Lo-
cal Government Act of 2009 are largely to blame for those conflicts, and 
that those contradctions are the manifestations of the top-down ap-
proach of state building. Specifically, the paper shows how a combina-
tion of the Land Act and the Local Government Act has strengthened 
the links between local authorities and land administration, and between 
land ownership and rural communities. These relations have resulted in 
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heightened competition over authority in rural areas as a strategy to 
control land. The link between rural communities and land ownership 
has caused conflicts around authority to take the form of land conflicts 
between communities. The existing laws are inadequate to address land-
related conflicts in rural areas, allowing local conflicts to easily escalate 
into wider ones. This, we argue, explains the rapid increase in “ethnic 
conflicts” in South Sudan during the interim period and since independ-
ence in 2011.  
Data for this paper were collected in Yei River County in South Su-
dan during three visits (November 2011 to June 2012, September 2012 to 
April 2013, and January to February 2015), based on an ethnographic field 
approach. Research methods included extended interviews, focus group 
discussions (FGD), participant observation, and workshops. Key inform-
ants included government officials, traditional authorities, community 
leaders, and members of non-governmental organisations (NGO) and civil 
society.1 This paper is structured as follows: The first section analyses land 
reform in post-conflict settings in a context of changing relations of gov-
ernance. The second section provides some historical background on land, 
statehood, and conflict in Sudan and South Sudan. The third section high-
lights changes in governance in the study area and contextualises this to 
the two conflicts. The fourth section discusses land reform in South 
Sudan, and in the fifth section conclusions are elaborated. 
Land Reform in Changing Relations of
Governance in Post-Conflict Settings 
The debate about land reform continues to be central to the wider dis-
cussions on state building in post-conflict settings. This is particularly 
true in cases where land played a role in causing the conflicts. In such 
contexts, land reform aims to improve tenure security to ultimately re-
duce poverty. Poverty is arguably a strong indicator of conflicts, wars, 
and human suffering (Stewart 2016). In this paper, we conceptualise 
tenure security as a system of institutions or rules on land ownership, 
use, management, responsibilities, and constraints on how land is owned 
and used (Mitchell 2011). 
In Africa, land continues to be a major source of conflict, civil wars, 
and underdevelopment. Past attempts to consolidate land rights through 
1  This paper is an output of the research programme “Grounding Land Govern-
ance,” funded by WOTRO – Science for Global Development – NWO; The 
Netherlands: Grant number W 01.65.332.00. 
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private ownership of land have not only failed to achieve results, but also 
contributed to social inequality and conflicts (Stewart 2016). Because of 
the increasing levels of social inequality and conflict resulting from the 
private ownership of land, the debates on land reform in Africa have 
shifted to focusing on the consolidation of land rights of rural commu-
nities through customary landholdings based on communal land owner-
ship. This model is favoured because a great number of people in Africa 
continue to have access to land through their membership in landowning 
communities (Leonardi 2013). This is also because of the advantages 
individuals derive from clan- and ethnic-based networks (Sikor and 
Müller 2009). Yet, land continues to be a challenging aspect of state 
building in Africa, particularly in post-conflict settings.  
We argue that the contemporary approach to state building in post-
conflict settings, which is largely top-down, has tended to produce land-
reform regimes that do not correspond to realities on the ground. In 
South Sudan, land reform has tended to ignore changes in society and 
regarding land brought about by the British colonial administration and 
the SPLA during the North–South civil war. We suggest that a bottom-
up approach to state building could enhance our understanding of those 
changes, and might contribute to the development of realistic ap-
proaches to land reform. Understanding these dynamics requires 
(1) revisiting the relations between state building and land reform, 
(2) taking a critical look at the changing property of land resulting from 
changes in local governance, and (3) unpacking some of the misconcep-
tions around land rights. 
To start with, contemporary state building embraces the Weberian 
model of the state, which perceives statehood through its ability (or 
inability) to have a monopoly over the use of violence, exert control over 
its borders, and deliver services to its populace (Schlichte 2016). With 
this understanding, the focus is to develop the capacity, institutions, and 
legitimacy of the state in relation to effective political processes for ne-
gotiating mutual demand between the state and the society. It is based on 
the idea that a post-conflict setting provides a “blank slate” for Weberian 
state institutions to be built, often ignoring history and local contexts 
(Myerson 2011). Linking this to land reform, statehood implies strength-
ening formal land institutions based on success stories from elsewhere. 
But in practice, a post-conflict setting is neither a blank slate nor ahis-
toric. Even during civil wars, governance by a variety of state and non-
state institutions continues (Öhm 2014), and warfare itself is closely con-
nected to state building (Tilly 1999). By the end of civil wars, public 
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authority is often an amalgamation of local and national institutions, 
where external institutions are often also imposed (Lund 2006). 
Further, changes to local governance are often associated with 
changes in social relations and regarding land. This is because land con-
tinues to be understood in many African countries in terms of social 
relations rather than as “property” (Peters 2009). Unpacking the colonial 
history will shed more light on this. Colonialism in Africa had resulted in 
coercive resettlement of some communities to areas selected by the col-
onisers. Instead of being mobile and having overlapping networks and 
shifting boundaries (Lentz 2000: 107), communities became fixed to 
settlements demarcated by borders. Those changes also shifted the roles 
of traditional leadership to include paying attention to territories and 
boundaries rather than primarily people (Mamdani 1996). Likewise, the 
colonial powers replaced a great number of precolonial traditional lead-
ers with individual chiefs best suited to achieve colonial objectives 
(Leonardi 2013). By the end of the colonial era, a great number of post-
colonial governments had inherited the colonial idea of chiefdom, and 
became deeply rooted in local governance to an extent that some local 
communities believe these governance structures to be fully home-grown 
rather than vestiges of colonial manipulations (Johnson 2011). Postcolo-
nial countries that went through civil wars experienced more changes to 
local governance by state and non-state actors. During civil wars, military 
victories often translated into changes to governance and territorial bound-
aries (Öhm 2014). Peluso and Lund (2011) argue that changes in institu-
tional capacities and legitimacies resulting from civil wars might become 
irreversible by the end of such wars.  
In addition, the distinction between different forms of land owner-
ship continues to be a major problem within debates on land reform. 
Confusion resulting from this translates into challenges faced by practi-
tioners in addressing the land question. For instance, most African 
countries distinguish between public, private, and communal land, re-
spectively owned by the state, private entities, and communities. But 
these categories are often treated as distinct entities, which is not neces-
sarily the case. Communal land is, for example, commonly associated 
with open access (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006). However, in some 
cases clans and families privately own land within communal land, 
sometimes retaining the right to exchange that land for “gifts.” Recent 
evidence suggests these “gifts” are becoming increasingly monetised 
(Leonardi and Santschi 2016), causing communal land to take on some 
aspects of private land. Private land, on the other hand, is not exclusively 
private. In some contexts, a certain level of control can be imposed by a 
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variety of actors, including the state, local communities, and users’ asso-
ciations, to mention a few. It is also debatable whether public land is 
absolutely state-owned. The use of such land for the development of 
roads, game reserves, and recreational areas for citizens bestows upon 
this land some aspects of “common access,” often associated with com-
munal land. This blurriness leads to some dilemmas on land ownership 
and particularly on communal land, raising questions such as, “How 
communal is communal and whose communal is it?” (von Benda-Beck-
mann and von Benda-Beckmann 2006: 194) As we show later, confusion 
resulting from this has made it easy for the South Sudanese authority to 
interfere with community land. Indeed, taking a step back to critically 
reflect on these categories of land might be useful in developing a realis-
tic approach to land reform in post-conflict settings. 
Land, Statehood, and Conflict in  
Sudan and South Sudan 
Land Politics in Pre-Secession Sudan 
Land has been central to statehood in Sudan and a major contributor to 
conflicts and instability. The North–South civil war that ended up split-
ting the country into Sudan and South Sudan was one such conflict. 
Those conflicts often emerged in reaction to “repressive” policies of the 
government in Khartoum, particularly those that infringed on land rights 
of rural communities (Johnson 2011). At a certain point, those policies 
resulted in the state claiming ownership of up to 80 per cent of the total 
land area of the country, mostly in rural areas (Wily 2009). The founda-
tion of most of those policies was laid by colonialism. Of those policies, 
the Unregistered Land Act of 1970 and the Land Transaction Ordinance 
of 1984 – the latter of which builds on the 1898 Land Registration Or-
dinance, enacted under British colonial rule – directly contributed to the 
North–South civil war that started in 1983 (Deng 2011). This war was a 
continuation of the first North–South civil war ended through the Addis 
Ababa Agreement of 1972.  
That agreement, for example, gave southern Sudan a semi-autono-
mous status, with northern and southern Sudan separated by the borders 
left by British colonial rule at Sudanese independence in 1956. Because 
of that agreement, the High Executive Council and the Southern Re-
gional Legislative Assembly became the respective executive and legisla-
tive organs in southern Sudan. In theory, this government was to oversee 
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the management of natural resources in southern Sudan, including land. 
However, the government in Khartoum continued to interfere directly to 
exploit resources and particularly land. Those interferences included land 
leases to northern merchants, along with the attempt to construct the 
Jonglei Canal (Johnson 2011). Following the discovery of oil reserves in 
the South by the end of 1970s, the government in Khartoum started to 
redraw the North–South borders and renamed some of the resource-rich 
areas so that they would become part of the North. For example, West-
ern Upper Nile was renamed El Wehda (meaning “unity”), and Panthou, 
Higlig (Johnson 2012). In addition to other factors, tensions around land 
contributed to the 1983 rebellion in Bor, which sparked the formation of 
the SPLM/A (Öhm 2014). Land also played a role in ending the civil war. 
When negotiating the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the SPLM/A 
pushed for the inclusion of land reform, which ultimately succeeded. 
This made land reform a crucial aspect of state building in South Sudan, 
at least in theory. 
Land Reform and Conflict in South Sudan 
Hence, land reform in South Sudan started against the backdrop of his-
torical injustices around land. It therefore aimed to address those injus-
tices and avoid future conflicts. The CPA provided the legal basis for a 
countrywide land reform (GoS 2005: 49), and the authority in South 
Sudan conceptualised the wartime slogans “the land belongs to the 
community” and “taking towns to the people” to develop the Land Act 
and the Local Government Act as frameworks on land reform in South 
Sudan. Per the CPA, South Sudan was to institute the South Sudan Land 
Commission (SSLC), which would be decentralised to the lower levels of 
the government (states, counties, payams, and bomas) this way: each of the 
10 states was to have a state land commission (SLC), each SLC was to be 
decentralised to a county land authority (CLA), each CLA to a payam 
land council (PLC), and each PLC to a boma land administration (BLA).  
The agreement also provided for the establishment of local gov-
ernment structures in South Sudan based on the 10 states, instituted by 
the government in Khartoum, and the county–payam–boma system, in-
stituted by the SPLA during wartime (Öhm 2014). Accordingly, South 
Sudan was divided into 10 states, each subdivided into lower levels of 
counties, payams, and bomas, respectively headed by paramount, head, and 
executive chiefs who by the virtue of this upgrade became local govern-
ment officials. However, while paramount and head chiefs are included 
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on the government’s payroll, executive chiefs are not.2 The Land Act 
gives the authority of land administration in rural areas to community 
leaders (GoSS a 2009: 15), but the Local Government Act acknowledges 
chiefs as government officials and traditional leaders. This caused chiefs 
to assume duties of land administration, taking over the role of monye 
menu, the traditional land custodian. The complementarity between the 
Land Act and the Local Government Act led to the local government 
structures forming the basis of land reform.  
At South Sudanese independence, the ruling SPLM adopted these 
acts as the legal frameworks on land. In coordination with land-govern-
ing institutions at the lower levels, the South Sudan Land Commission 
would develop national land policies and advise relevant government 
institutions on land matters. The Land Act distinguishes between public, 
private, and community land – respectively owned by the state, private 
entities, and communities on a basis of autochthony (GoSS a 2009: 13–
14). Land in all rural areas falls under the category of communal land. 
With more than 80 per cent of its population living in rural areas,3 a great 
deal of land in South Sudan is communally owned.  
But since the beginning, the focus of land reform has been on 
strengthening the SSLC, and little attention has been paid to institutions 
at the subnational levels. Out of the 10 states, for example, only Jonglei 
and the three states of Equatoria (Eastern, Central, and Western Equato-
ria) managed to institute state land commissions. However, none of 
those commissions managed to devolve their duties to the county land 
authority, then to the payam land council, then to the boma land admin-
istration. In October 2015, President Salva Kiir issued an order to in-
crease the number of the states from 10 to 28,4 and on 14 January 2017 
the number was raised to 32.5 This will imply the abolition of the existing 
state land commissions and the subsequent formation of 32 new ones, 
each to be devolved down till the boma level. 
But alongside processes of state building, South Sudan witnessed 
increased levels of violent conflicts, covering most parts of the country. 
2  Interviews, head chief, Tore, 25 May 2012, and head chief, Mugwo, 2 February 
2013.  
3  World Bank, Rural Population (% of Total Population): South Sudan, online: <http://da 
ta.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=SS> (13 January 2017).  
4  Sudan Tribune, South Sudan President Expands States to 28 as Opposition Ac-
cuses Him of Deal Violation, 3 October 2015, online: <www.sudantribune.com/ 
spip.php?article56581> (5 October 2015).  
5  Sudan Tribune, South Sudanese President Creates Four More States, 16 January 
2017, online: <www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article61403> (17 January 2017).  
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Small-scale conflicts escalated to wider conflicts, some to rebellion. Con-
flicts that are rooted in contestations among political elites also trickled 
down to cause tensions between communities, often along ethnic lines 
(De Vries and Justin 2014). In most cases, land is either the immediate 
cause of or a platform for expressing other grievances (Justin and van 
Leeuwen 2016). So, (1) how does the current approach to state building 
influence land reform? (2) To what extent, if at all, do the existing legal 
frameworks on land contribute to addressing the injustices that led to the 
North–South civil war? How can we explain the increased level of “eth-
nic conflict” within the framework of land reform? The conflicts in Yei 
River County discussed below shed some light on this.  
The Conflicts in Yei River County 
Changes in Local Land Governance 
The conflicts occurred in the two villages of Alero, in Mugwo Payam, 
and Goja, in Otogo Payam. Before discussing the cases, we give a brief 
overview of the county. Yei River County was one of the six counties of 
Central Equatoria State, subdivided into five payams: Yei, Mugwo, Otogo, 
Lasu, and Tore. Central Equatoria State comprised six counties: Tere-
keka, Juba, Lainya, Kajokeji, Yei, and Morobo. Because of the increase in 
the number of states in October 2015, the four counties of Yei, Morobo, 
Lainya, and Kajokeji were merged to become Yei River State, and each 
of the five payams of Yei upgraded to counties. Yei River State was sub-
divided into a total of thirteen counties.6 The counties of Terekeka and 
Juba were upgraded to states, with Juba renamed Jubek. The fieldwork 
for this paper was conducted before this increase. Reference to counties 
and payams throughout this paper is therefore made on the basis of the 
old administrative structure (see Figures 1 and 2).  
Yei River County has rather a complex history of local governance, 
which justifies our choice to conduct our fieldwork here. Interventions 
into Yei by British colonial rule and later by the SPLA during the North–
South civil war resulted in many changes to local governance – changes 
also reflected in how land is locally perceived or governed today. Demo-
graphically, the Kakwa forms the majority ethnic group in the county, so 
local governance practices are commonly based on Kakwa traditional 
6  Sudan Tribune, S. Sudan President Approves Creation of 13 Counties in Yei,  
23 August 2016, online: <www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60004> (14 July 
2017).  
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practices. In the precolonial period, traditional leadership in Yei was 
based on a group of stakeholders (monye menu – land custodian, matat lo 
kudu – chief of the rain, katokelanit – traditional healer, and matat lo galaka 
– chief of the ranch), each tasked with a specific aspect of governance.7 
A menu was (and still is) the basic territorial unit owned by a clan, and the 
monye menu was tasked with land administration within the menu on behalf 
of the landowning clan.8 During the colonial period, the British colonial 
administration in Yei forcefully resettled various clans from their tradi-
tional settlements to preselected areas, arguably to eradicate sleeping 
sickness (Bloss 1960). In the process, this administration replaced the 
group of traditional leaders with individual chiefs who became facilita-
tors between the colonial administration and its subjects.9 Most of those 
settlements remained villages throughout the postcolonial period. During 
the civil war (1983–2004), the SPLA made more changes to traditional 
leadership and in the villages, by replacing “incapable” chiefs with those 
who could help achieve its military objectives10 and by upgrading the 
villages to counties, payams, and bomas (Öhm 2014). The impact of those 
changes on land rights and conflict around land became clear after South 
Sudan started its land reform programme in 2005. 
The Conflict in Mugwo
In October 2011, the sub-chief of Alero Village reported to the county 
authority in Yei about an ongoing violent conflict between two clans, the 
Lugori and the Yondu. The conflict involved the use of firearms and re-
sulted in the injury of three individuals from the two clans.11 Alero is some 
seven miles southeast of Yei Town, along the main road connecting Yei to 
Kaya at the Ugandan border (see Figure 2). The county authority re-
sponded by sending police officers to stop the violence and to bring those 
involved in the conflict to the magistrate court in Yei. Contests over own-
ership of this village were reported to be the immediate cause of the con-
flict. But as investigations into this conflict continued, it became clear that 
the fight was deeply rooted in competition over leadership.  
7  FGD, land custodians and chiefs, Yei, 5 May 2012, and interviews with commu-
nity leader, Yei, 16 November 2012, and land custodian, Rwonyi, 31 January 
2012. 
8  Interview, Lasu community leaders, Yei, 16 November 2012 . 
9  Interview, community leader, Tore, 20 May 2012. 
10  Interview, head chief, Mugwo in Yei, 9 November 2012.  
11  Interview, Lugori member, Yei, 10 November 2012.  
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Oral histories suggest this area was traditionally owned by a clan 
called the Permasu, who gave part of their land to the Lugori based on 
historical relationships. During the colonial era, the British colonial ad-
ministration in Yei moved the Permasu clan some five miles from Yei 
Town, leaving the Lugori clan behind. At the same time, the colonial 
administration moved the Yondu clan from Payawa Village, some 11 
miles from Yei Town, to settle in this area, opposite the Lugori clan, 
along the main road. The land where the Yondu are settled also belongs 
to the Permasu clan, implying the Lugori were also in charge. However, 
the Yondu came to claim legitimacy over this piece of land, as it was 
allocated to them by the British administrator. Over time, the two clans 
developed good relationships, and on the basis of marriage, some fami-
lies from the Yondu moved to the Lugori side of the land. While in their 
new settlement, the Permasu clan continued to refer to this area as its 
ancestral land.12 
In the late 1980s, SPLA forces started to move towards Yei Town, 
forcing most rural communities around Yei Town, including Lugori 
and Yondu, to flee their villages to hide deep in the forests, while 
others crossed borders to take refuge in Uganda and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC).13 This was because rural communities 
settling along main roads were targeted for compulsory conscription 
into the army by the SPLA or attacked by the Sudanese Armed Forces 
under allegations of supporting rebels. After the CPA, some families 
from among the Lugori and Yondu returned to settle in their respec-
tive areas, with the Yondu families that settled on the Lugori side of 
the land settling alongside the Lugori.14  
But shortly after their return, Yondu elders and their headman put a 
signpost along the main road with a map covering the entire area, and 
named it “Yondu Land.” This act provoked Lugori elders and their 
headman who, in turn, attempted to evict the Yondu families on their 
side of the land. But those families resisted eviction. Also, the entire clan 
of Yondu and their headman supported those families in resisting the 
eviction. The sub-chief of Alero suggested outside court that the Yondu 
should not be evicted.15 Involvement of the two headmen and the sub-
chief in this conflict made it not possible for the three to resolve it, 
which is why it escalated into violence. 
12  Interview, community leader, Yei, 6 January 2012. 
13  Interview, Lugori member, Yei, 10 November 2012. 
14  Interview, Lugori elder, Yei, 27 November 2012. 
15  Interview, sub-chiefs, Alero, 16 November 2012.  
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The police forces arrested those involved in the violence and pre-
sented them to the magistrate court in Yei. The court sentenced each of 
the two individuals (one from Lugori and one from Yondu) who spear-
headed the violence to three months in prison. But the court could not 
address the land aspect, as it concerned land in a rural area. This is be-
cause the Land Act and the Local Government Act limit the authority of 
the county to land listed in the government’s registry within urban areas. 
For the same reason, the county authority could not resolve this conflict, 
but proposed the formation of a committee to consider the causes of the 
conflict and suggest solutions. The committee, headed by the county’s 
executive director, was comprised of chiefs from the three bomas of Pay-
awa, Longamere, and Yari, and land custodians (mose menua 16) from Per-
masu and Bori. However, members of the committee disagreed on how 
to resolve this conflict.  
The county’s executive director and the mose menua suggested the 
signpost be removed and that Yondu families on the Lugori side of the 
land return to the land allocated to them by the British. However, the 
three chiefs and representatives of the Yondu on the committee rejected 
this suggestion. But they did agree to the removal of the signpost as of 
part of the solution. Yondu representatives argued the proposal was 
biased against them because the committee was headed by the county’s 
executive director, who was at odds with their headman. This is because 
their headman was on the SPLA side of the war, while the executive 
director was with the government, and the bias was framed as a continu-
ation of wartime grievances.17 The Lugori, on the other hand, claimed 
the objection by the chiefs was biased because the chiefs came from the 
same mother clan as the Yondu (Payawa), and have been aspiring for a 
long time to have control over all of Mugwo. The committee could not 
impose its proposal, leaving this conflict unresolved. 
The Conflict in Otogo Payam  
The second conflict was in Goja Boma in Otogo Payam, between the 
Somba and Morsak clans. An immediate cause of this conflict was the 
disputed legality of a land lease between Somba elders and an investor, 
signed in December 2011. The lease concerns a land area of 210 hectares 
for a period of 10 years in Goja.18 The chief of Goja and the sub-chief of 
Morsak challenged the deal as illegal, because they were not involved as the 
16  Plural of monye menu. 
17  Interview, Lugori member, Alero, 16 November 2012.  
18  Interview, Morsak Sub-Boma, 14 November 2012.  
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legitimate authority in the area.19 Thus, the chief and sub-chief mobilised 
their communities to stop implementation of the project for which the 
lease was signed.20 In turn, Somba elders mobilised their people to con-
front the Morsak against stopping the project. As tensions around the 
lease intensified, this case was reported to the county authority in Yei. 
Like in Alero, this conflict was over land in a rural area, making it 
not possible for the county authority and the magistrate court to inter-
vene directly. The intervention by the magistrate court in the conflict in 
Alero came about because violence was involved in that conflicts there, 
which was not the case in Goja. Ultimately, the county commissioner 
proposed a committee to consider causes of this conflict and suggest 
solutions. The committee was comprised of elders from the two afore-
mentioned clans (Somba and Morsak) as well as from among the Logo 
and a neighbouring clan, the Mongo. Attempts to resolve this conflict 
lasted for three months, two months longer than in Alero, but ended in a 
deadlock. During this period, Somba and Morsak elders gave their nar-
ratives to justify their claims on the land. 
The “founding father” of the Somba had migrated from Koboko in 
present-day Uganda to Goja, and was given this piece of land by elders 
of the Logo clan, who traditionally owned this area. Over time, the two 
clans developed good relations, and the Logo gave that founding father 
an honorary clan name: Somba, meaning friendship. 21 Later, most Logo 
families migrated to settle some six miles down the Yei–Maridi road, 
going towards today’s Western Equatoria state. Most Somba families 
moved voluntarily to settle in Kegulu, some seven miles down the Yei–
DRC road. But all along, the Logo and Somba clans continued to refer 
to Goja as their ancestral area. 
During the colonial period, the British district commissioner in Yei 
appointed Baraba from Morsak as chief of Goja. Because of this ap-
pointment, more people from Morsak moved to settle in Goja. With the 
colonial policy, whereby chiefship is inherited within the same family, 
chiefship in Goja became linked to Baraba’s family. This family main-
tained its grip on power even during the time the SPLA was replacing 
many chiefs. With the changes to local governance brought by the Land 
Act and the Local Government Act, the chief of Goja (from Morsak) 
came to be in charge of land administrations in this area. For that reason, 
he and the sub-chiefs of Morsak argued that this gave them the legiti-
macy to negotiate the land lease with the investor. The Somba, on the 
19  Interview, Goja Boma, 14 November, 2012. 
20  Interview, Baraba’s family, Yei, 28 March 2013. 
21  Interview, Kakwa Community Association, Yei, 17 November 2012.  
!!! 18 Peter Hakim Justin and Han van Dijk !!!
other hand, consolidated their legitimacy to negotiate the lease on the 
basis of ancestry. They argued that they had acquired this land legiti-
mately as a gift from the Logo. Logo elders present in the committee 
substantiated this claim and supported the Somba arguments. Ultimately, 
the committee ruled that it was legitimate for the Somba to sign the 
lease, but proposed reducing the land lease size from 210 to 21 hectares, 
and the duration from 10 to 3 years. The size and duration of the lease 
can be increased only if both clans benefit. The lease proposal also sug-
gested, however, that the payment at the signing of the lease be given to 
the Somba. 
But both Morsak and Somba chiefs and elders objected to this pro-
posal. The Morsak saw this ruling as violating their legal rights as the 
authority in the area and their traditional rights as occupants of Goja. As 
for the Somba, they felt that the reduction of the land size and the lease 
period were mistakes, and that they should have the right to decide on 
the lease terms as the traditional landowners.22 While the mediations on 
the case were ongoing, the Morsak mobilised their people to settle 
around the land, obstructing the work of the investor. This forced the 
investor to abandon the project.23 Just like in Alero, the committee could 
not impose their solution, leaving this conflict unresolved.24  
Understanding Land Reform in South Sudan 
As our case has shown, land reform in South Sudan is characterised by a 
sharp dualism, combining elements of the statutory and customary laws. 
While the overall objective is to reverse historical injustices through 
consolidating the land right of rural communities, the reform programme 
has tended to take a top-down approach based on the Weberian model 
of the state. This has resulted in a policy gap between land laws and 
realities in rural areas. Returning to our main questions: How does the 
current approach to state building influence land reform? To what extent 
(if at all) do the existing legal frameworks on land contribute to address-
ing the root causes of the North–South civil war? How can we explain 
the increased level of “ethnic conflict” in South Sudan within the frame-
work of land reform?  
22  Interview, Kakwa Community Association, Yei, 27 November 2012.  
23  Interview, Baraba’s family, Yei, 28 March 2013. 
24  Interview, Lugori member, Yei, 10 November 2012.  
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State Building and Land Reform 
What becomes clear from our case is that the legacy of the North–South 
civil war (1983–2004) continues to influence state building in South 
Sudan. This is reflected in the focus by the South Sudanese authority and 
its partners on enhancing institutions of the central government, partly 
to maintain historical injustices. This served to strengthen the South 
Sudan Land Commission and to largely undermine lower-level institu-
tions, particularly those categorised as “customary.” Surprisingly little 
attention has been paid by the state authority to state land commissions 
and county land authorities, even though these fall under the category of 
“state institutions.” It seems as though the little amount of attention paid 
by the government and its development partners to the lower levels of 
the governance has made it difficult for the SSLC to achieve results. 
Development of national land policies and context-specific policies 
at the level of the individual states, provision of technical advice to rele-
vant government institutions, and arbitration of land conflicts are among 
the core duties of the SSLC. It is supposed to coordinate with state land 
commissions and the underlying land-governing institutions to reach 
these goals. But the failure to devolve the SSLC to the lower levels made 
it difficult for the commission to achieve these objectives. The Land Act 
of 2009 and the so-called “Land Policy,” the latter of which has yet to be 
signed into a law by the president, have been the only achievements of 
the SSLC since the 2005 CPA. There is little evidence to suggest that the 
SSLC is actually active in its advisory role vis-à-vis the relevant govern-
ment institutions.25 Even the Land Act it developed has tended to be 
problematic, as its implementation alongside the Local Government Act 
has generated contradictions, turning efforts for land reform into a 
source of conflicts. 
The Land Act, for example, groups land in rural areas into the cate-
gories “community land,” owned by rural communities on basis of au-
tochthony, and “public land,” owned by the state. But the incorporation 
of rural areas into the local government and the upgrading of chiefs to 
positions as government officials who oversee land in rural areas brought 
about some problems regarding land rights. Chiefs being in charge has 
raised the question of whether communities still have control over their 
land. In addition, by suggesting that land in rural areas is owned by local 
communities on the basis of autochthony, the Land Act has strength-
ened the link between identity and land ownership. This has resulted in 
challenging the authority of some chiefs known to have been appointed 
25  Interview, South Sudan Land Commission, 7 April 2013.  
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from outside those areas by the colonial administration or by the SPLA. 
In Otogo, for example, the chiefs of Goja and Morsak are not tradition-
ally from Goja. This caused the landowning Somba to constantly chal-
lenge those chiefs’ authority in administering their land. In this specific 
conflict, they did so by taking charge of the land lease with the investor, 
overriding the authority of the two chiefs. But the Morsak clan resisted 
this, resulting in tensions between the two clans.  
In Mugwo, we see a similar scenario at a play. Both clans are “for-
eign” in Alero, but each attempted to assert its authority over the land. 
The Yondu clan did so by developing a map that indicated it was in 
charge. But the Lugori resisted this, and won the favour of the county 
authority and the two mose menua of Permasu and Bori. But the Yondu 
objection to this ruling also made it difficult to resolve the case, as the 
committee is not legitimised to impose the ruling. If the Yondu were to 
succeed in asserting their control over this area, their headman would 
oversee land in the whole area occupied by the Yondu and the Lugori, 
meaning the Lugori will seek the permission of the Yondu’s headman to 
use the land even though the Lugori settled there earlier than the Yondu.  
Contests around traditional leadership in relation to land control 
commonly occur in rural areas, but some cases do occur in urban cen-
tres. Within Yei Town, for example, Dinka chiefs are constantly accused 
of allocating land belonging to local communities to their displaced peo-
ple, resulting in conflicts. These chiefs justify their actions on the basis of 
the wording in the Land Act, which states that “all land in South Sudan 
is owned by the people of South Sudan and its usage shall be regulated 
by the government” (Justin and van Leeuwen 2016). The focus on 
strengthening institutions at the national level and the subsequent failure 
to achieve results is not limited to land reform in South Sudan, but also 
occurs in other sectors. Within the security sector reform, for example, 
Copeland (2015) suggests this approach has contributed to the emer-
gence of various rebellions against the government in Juba.  
Land Reform and Rights  
Among the major causes of the North–South tensions and the subse-
quent civil war were land policies that misappropriated land rights of 
rural communities, marginalisation of peripheral areas through govern-
ance, and recreation of governance structures that favoured northern 
Sudan. With the focus of land reform on addressing those injustices, to 
what extent is South Sudan on track? In other words, to what extent (if 
at all) do the existing legal frameworks on land contribute to addressing 
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the injustices that led to the civil war? The case in Yei and examples 
from other settings in South Sudan suggest a gloomy outlook. 
Contrary to the SPLM’s wartime articulation that consolidation of 
land rights was its priority, what surfaces clearly is that the SPLM-led 
government is increasingly interfering with the land rights of rural com-
munities – perhaps in an even more detrimental way than its predeces-
sor, the government of Sudan. Following the footsteps of its predeces-
sor, the SPLM government has tended to develop policies that make it 
easy for it to interfere with the land rights of rural communities. The 
reframing of the wartime slogan “the land belongs to the community” to 
“all land in South Sudan is owned by the people of South Sudan and its 
usage shall be regulated by the government” has, for example, given the 
state the legal basis to interfere with community land under the guise of 
“land regulation.” The Land Act strengthens this further by giving the 
state the right to convert community or “unowned” land to public land 
(GoSS a 2009: 13). What is problematic is that conditions for the conver-
sion of community land to public land remain totally unclear. But the 
notion of “unowned land” raises suspicions, as “all land in South Sudan 
is owned, in one way or another” (Deng 2011: 1). Also, within this re-
framing, the change from “community” to “the people of South Sudan” 
has contributed to tensions between communities, resulting in specula-
tions that the state deliberately reworded the text in order to give other 
communities legal backing to claim land ownership outside their ances-
tral areas – specifically, the Dinka in Equatoria.26 Because of the refram-
ing of the land laws, the Land Act, for example, gives those occupying 
land in “good faith” for at least three years from the start of the CPA in 
2005 the right of ownership or a right to compensation by the traditional 
landowner (GoSS a 2009: 82), which has contributed to heightened ten-
sions between new occupants and returning pre-war landowners, adding 
to the speculation that land occupation is politically motivated. These 
speculations are strengthened by the increasing involvement of Dinka in 
land conflicts in various areas in Equatoria. As we pointed out earlier, 
this has resulted in conflicts between Dinka and local communities in 
Yei. Elsewhere, this has resulted in conflicts between Dinka and Bari in 
Juba (Badiey 2013), between Dinka and Madi in Nimule (Schomerus and 
Allen 2010), and even across the border into the DRC between Dinka 
and Congolese authorities (De Vries 2011).   
Also at the policy level, the incorporation of chiefs (most of whom 
continue to be SPLM appointees) into local government and their legiti-
26  Interview, academic, University of Juba, 30 October 2011.  
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misation to oversee land administration in their jurisdictions has opened 
more avenues for the state to use chiefs as agents of land control. Be-
tween 2007 and 2010, for example, the state leased out an estimated 9 
per cent of the total land area of South Sudan to domestic and foreign 
investors, mainly in rural areas facilitated by chiefs (Deng 2011: 7). 
Last, the division of the southern region into the three regions of 
Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr el Ghazal and the redrawing of the 
North–South borders were among the land-related causes of the civil war. 
In South Sudan today we see history repeating itself. The presidential order 
to increase the number of the states to 28 resulted in tensions, at the pol-
itical level between the government and opposition forces allied to Riek 
Macher, leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in 
Opposition (SPLM/A-IO 27), and at the societal level among various com-
munities. Because of this increase, it became difficult to implement the 
peace agreement signed between the SPLM/A-IO and the government in 
August 2015, as the agreement was based on the 10 states. At the local 
level, this has resulted in tensions between Dinka and Shilluk, as it gives 
the eastern part of the state of Upper Nile, traditionally owned by Shilluk, 
to Padak Dinka. The increase of January 2017 to 32 states is likely to ex-
acerbate the tension around land ownership and internal borders. In a nut-
shell, the South Sudan authority is far from achieving its land reform 
objectives. To the contrary, what we see is increased levels of violence and 
civil wars around land resulting from the current land laws.  
Land Reform and Conflict 
The cases in Mugwo and Otogo and other examples in South Sudan 
suggest the current reform programme is not only a contributor to con-
flicts, but also lacks adequate conflict-resolution mechanisms. This to a 
great extent explains the rapid increase in “ethnic conflicts” in South 
Sudan during the interim period and after independence. The cases in 
Otogo and Mugwo suggest that the lack of clarity on the roles of differ-
ent levels of governance in conflict mitigation and resolution, confusion 
on the body of laws to be applied in conflicts, and the increasing in-
volvement of traditional leaders in conflicts have all laid the groundwork 
for violence around land. While the Land Act gives the state the author-
ity to regulate community land in rural areas, it does not explicitly specify 
the extent to which the state can do so, nor does it delineate the state’s 
27  The SPLM/A-IO was formed as a rebel movement after the conflict that 
started between the presidential guards loyal to President Salva Kiir and Vice 
President Riak Macher in December 2013 (also see De Vries and Justin 2014).  
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role in conflict mitigation and resolution. The same act suggests the 
authority of the state vis-à-vis land regulation is limited to registered land 
in urban centres. In relation to the authority of chiefs, the Local Gov-
ernment Act gives chiefs the authority on land regulation, but limits their 
power to the resolution of non-criminal conflicts within their jurisdic-
tions. These contradictions seem to have made county authorities dis-
tance themselves from land-related conflicts in rural areas. At the same 
time, this has made chiefs unable to resolve criminal cases even if those 
are linked to land.  
In Mugwo and Otogo, the county authority could not intervene di-
rectly in resolving the two conflicts because both were reported as land 
conflicts. It proposed the formation of committees that ultimately could 
not resolve the conflicts because they did not have the mandate to en-
force judgements. In the case in Mugwo, the magistrate court intervened 
because armed violence was involved, which falls outside the authority 
of the chief. This intervention was, however, limited to stopping the 
violence but not the root cause of the conflict. The chiefs in Otogo and 
Somba and the headmen in Alero would in principle resolve those con-
flicts at the root. But their involvement in the conflicts made it impossi-
ble for them to resolve this. Involvement of chiefs in conflict and the 
limited authority of the county and the magistrate court in conflicts that 
are perceived as land-related has led to many such conflicts being left 
unresolved. This has seemingly set a precedent for rural communities 
deliberately escalating conflicts to a violent level in order to involve 
higher authorities. In Giru Village near Yei Town, for example, the mag-
istrate court declined to attend to a land dispute between two families 
because it was in a village. But later, the court got involved after this 
conflict escalated to open violence involving various communities, 
threatening the stability of Yei Town (Justin and van Leeuwen 2016: 
431). This was similarly the case in what came to be framed as “ethnic 
conflict” between Bari and Mundari in Mangalla (Justin 2015).   
Yet another challenge is figuring out which laws are relevant to ap-
ply. While chiefs are trained by government officials, including by judges, 
on conflict resolution based on government laws, they are expected to 
judge cases in traditional courts based on customs (GoSS b 2009: 48). 
What is challenging is that government laws are mainly based on pun-
ishing offenders, whereas the customary laws tend to emphasise media-
tion and reparation. These dilemmas are increasingly leading chiefs to 
blend the two philosophies, often producing judgements that are easily 
contested. In Otogo, for example, by giving the Somba the right to lease 
the land, this ruling contradicted both the government laws and the 
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customary land laws. The existing land laws would give the chiefs of 
Goja and Morsak the right as the legitimate authority to coordinate the 
lease, and those chiefs would discuss with the Somba how to share the 
dividends. On the basis of customs, the Morsak have the right to use the 
land, but give the Somba kewatat, or 25 per cent of the lease value, in this 
specific case.28 But this is only relevant if the land lease can be accepted 
as secondary land use entitled for use by “outsiders.” Also on the basis 
of customs, the committee should have criticised the land lease, as 
“Kakwa customs do not allow land sales.”29 Though the committee 
declared the Somba the legitimate party to sign the lease, the Morsak 
blocked the whole project and no law could evict them. This resulted in 
forcing the investor to withdraw the project. In Alero, government laws 
would support the proposal that the Yondu families leave. However, 
traditional laws will give them the right to stay, as they have buried their 
ancestors in this area, giving them the right to refer to this area as their 
ancestral land (also see Leonardi and Santschi 2016). The challenge in 
choosing the right law also contributed to the disagreement among the 
committee members and hence the failure to resolve this conflict. 
Last, the involvement of the chiefs in the conflicts is perhaps the 
main contributor to the failure to resolve the two conflicts. This also 
made it easy for the chiefs in Goja and Mugwo to mobilise their com-
munities for violence under the pretext of “protecting their land.” As we 
have also seen in the two cases, the current laws lack any mechanism to 
resolve conflict that involves chiefs – particularly when such conflicts are 
reported as land-related, which was the case in Otogo and Mugwo. Even 
if conflicts between chiefs are reported as such, it will still be difficult to 
address this, as the existing laws give chiefs immunity from prosecution 
(GoSS b 2009: 52). 
Conclusion  
Drawing on cases in two rural settings in Yei River County, this paper 
elaborated the relationship between land reform and conflict in South 
Sudan during the interim period and after independence. It showed that 
contradictions in the existing land laws have strengthened the link be-
28  “Kewatat” comes from a Kakwa word meaning the foreleg of an animal; the 
term is used to designate a compensation for landing communities when their 
land is used as hunting ground. Chiefs around Yei have agreed that kewatat  
should be set at 25% of land value if the land is used for purposes other than 
hunting (Interview, community leader, Yei, 31 January 2012).  
29  Interview, Kakwa Community Associaton, Yei, 16 November 2012.  
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tween traditional leadership and land administration, and between land 
ownership and rural communities. These relations resulted in conten-
tious competitions over leadership in rural areas as a strategy for land 
control. But the link between land ownership and community has caused 
conflicts around traditional leadership to take the form of land conflicts 
between communities. The existing laws are inadequate to resolve land 
conflicts in rural areas, particularly when chiefs are involved in such con-
flicts. This has made it easy for small-scale violence to escalate into wider 
conflicts, whether intentionally or unintentionally. This, to some extent, 
explains the rapid emergence of “ethnic conflicts” in South Sudan since 
the start of the interim period.  
The paper has also shed new light on the debates on statehood and 
state building by questioning the appropriateness of the top-down ap-
proach to state building in South Sudan, which has tended to neglect 
changes in society and regarding land that have been caused by historical 
interventions on the part of various actors. In this specific case, the pa-
per has highlighted the relevance of understanding history and changes 
in local governance resulting from historical interventions and the possi-
ble implications of these for state building in countries emerging from 
civil wars or undergoing land reform. When there is a lack of clarity on 
existing land laws and a dearth of adequate mechanisms for conflict 
resolution, small-scale conflicts around land can easily escalate into wider 
conflicts and can be framed as “land conflicts” or “ethnic conflicts” even 
though land or ethnic belonging are not necessarily the immediate trig-
gers of such conflicts. The conflicts in Mugwo and Otogo clearly 
demonstrated this conflation.  
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Landreform und Konflikt im Südsudan:  
Erkenntnisse aus Yei River County 
Zusammenfassung: Nach der Unabhängigkeit des Südsudan im Jahr 2011 
wurde die Landreform zu einem wesentlichen Aspekt der Staatsbildung, 
teils um historisches Unrecht auszugleichen, teils aber auch, um künftige 
Konflikte um Land zu verhindern. Im Verlauf der Zeit wurde jedoch Land 
zum Ausgangspunkt für Konflikte, auch zwischen Gemeinden, in denen es 
keine Geschichte „ethnischer Konflikte“ gab. Anhand zweier Fallstudien 
ländlicher Gebiete im Yei River County im Südsudan zeigen die Autoren, 
dass diese Konflikte vor allem aus Widersprüchen im bestehenden Rechts-
rahmen für Land und Boden entstehen. Die Widersprüche selbst führen 
sie auf den Top-down-Ansatz der Staatsbildung zurück, der den gesell-
schaftlichen und ländlichen Wandel – ein Ergebnis von Kolonialismus und 
Bürgerkriegen – vielfach außer Acht lässt. 
Schlagwörter: Südsudan, Nationen- und Staatenbildung, Agrarreform, 
Bodenrecht, Sozialer Konflikt, Sozialer Wandel, Geschichte 
 
